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Abstract
With California’s Proposition 187 in 1994 as the backdrop for the relationship 
between Latinos and the Republican Party, this article explores the impact that the 
2012 Presidential Election had on Latinos and the growing influence of Latinos 
in American Politics. I look at the historical roots of the relationship between the 
GOP and Latinos and the short road that brought us to the apogee of anti-Latino 
rhetoric throughout the 2012 Presidential Election and the GOP primary elections. 
I discuss whether or not the immigration issue has formed a structural barrier to 
the GOP’s relationship Latinos. Next, this article looks at the outreach effort by the 
GOP, in particular the missteps and miscommunication between Republican Latino 
organizations and the Romney campaign. Last, I look at the results of the election and 
discuss what this could mean for the future of Latino politics and for the country. I 
also briefly look at the structural features of our electoral system that is hampering the 
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GOPs ability to reach out to Latinos. I conclude with a short discussion on what the 
GOP can do to change this and how the Democrats should consider responding.  
Keywords: Latinos, politics, GOP – Grand Old Party (Republicans), elections, 
Democratic Party, outreach, structures
Resumen
Con la Proposición 187 de California en 1994 como telón de fondo de la 
relación entre los latinos y el Partido Republicano, este artículo explora el impacto que 
la elección presidencial de 2012 tuvo sobre los latinos y la creciente influencia de los 
latinos en la política estadounidense. Miro a las raíces históricas de la relación entre el 
Partido Republicano y los latinos y el camino corto que nos trajo al auge de la retórica 
anti-latina en las elecciones presidenciales de 2012 y las elecciones primarias del 
Partido Republicano. Discuto si el tema de la inmigración se ha formado una barrera 
estructural para los latinos la relación del Partido Republicano. A continuación, este 
artículo analiza el esfuerzo de divulgación por el Partido Republicano, en particular, 
los errores y falta de comunicación entre las organizaciones de latinos republicanos 
y la campaña de Romney. Pasado, miro los resultados de las elecciones y discutir lo 
que esto podría significar para el futuro de la política latina y para el país. También 
miro brevemente las características estructurales de nuestro sistema electoral que 
está dificultando la capacidad GOP para llegar a los latinos. Concluyo con una breve 
discusión sobre lo que el Partido Republicano se puede hacer para cambiar esto y cómo 
los demócratas deberían considerar la posibilidad de responder.
Palabras clave: latinos, política, del Partido Republicano - Grand Old Party 
(Republicanos), las elecciones, el Partido Democrático, el alcance, las estructuras
*****
1. INTRODUCTION 
In what may be a watershed moment for the influence of Latinos on the future 
of national politics, the 2012 Presidential Election was a moment of emerging promise 
not only for Latinos, but for the formation of a viably strong and diverse coalition 
between minority groups and progressive whites to counter the historically dominant 
conservative white majority of the country.   Latinos largely have the GOP to thank for 
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this growing phenomenon, as it was largely by their miscalculation to use anti-Latino 
sentiment to mobilize white voters that drove Latinos to participate in record numbers 
and join the overwhelming minority vote for President Obama. 
The relationship between the Republican Party and Latinos is a sordid one, 
filled with half-starts, half-promises, and seemingly unending examples of how not 
to appeal to an electorate.  But despite this relationship, hope remains among the 
dwindling numbers of Latino Republicans that the GOP will someday put forth the 
type of effort needed to make Latinos a force within the party.  So far this has not 
happened, and perhaps this election will give the GOP the incentive it needs to bring 
Latinos into the fold, but the party still needs to work out among themselves how their 
principles can appeal to Latinos without giving it’s important conservative base the 
impression that the Republican Party is “pandering” to Latinos.  
This is a tall order, and the poor showing in the 2012 Presidential Election 
for the GOP among Latinos is the culmination of a long road of decisions that began 
in California in 1994 over a proposition advanced by conservatives to attack Latinos 
through means of political and social isolation by prohibiting them from accessing 
public resources, such as education, health care and other social services.  While 
Proposition 187, the “Save our State” proposition, passed, the harsh rhetoric used to 
advance this proposition stained the relationship between Latinos and the GOP in way 
the party has not recovered and which has had a ripple affect across the country with 
equally antagonistic results. 
With this as the backdrop, this article explores the impact that the 2012 
Presidential Election had on Latinos and the growing influence of Latinos in American 
Politics. First, I will look at the historical roots of the relationship between the GOP 
and Latinos. Given the recent animosity between the two, a step back to see how we 
got here would provide context to what happened not only in the 2012 Presidential 
Election, but in the primary elections, which have come to be a structural barrier to the 
GOP’s relationship Latinos.  
Second, this article will look at the outreach effort by the GOP, in particular 
the missteps and miscommunication between Republican Latino organizations and 
the Romney campaign. Last, I will look at the results of the election and discuss what 
this may mean for the future of Latino politics and for the country.  I will also briefly 
look at the structural features of our electoral system that is hampering the GOPs 
ability to reach out to Latinos. I will end with a short discussion on what the GOP can 




The relationship between Latinos and the GOP was not always a rocky one 
and it began several decades before the anti-immigrant California proposition in 
1994, Prop 187.  As an emerging minority group with a long established history in the 
Southwest, the GOP witnessed how the John F. Kennedy campaign first reached out to 
Latinos in Texas through Senator Lyndon B. Johnson’s nomination as Vice President 
in 1960. At the same time across the Southwest in California, Ronald Reagan gained 
popularity and influence within the Republican Party and his California roots was the 
beginning of his relationship with Latinos.
As Governor of California in the 1960’s, Ronald Reagan recognized the 
growing importance of Latinos in that state and supported policies that were friendly 
towards the Latino demographic.  While Latinos viewed Reagan’s approach to them 
more favorably, Reagan was cutting his teeth in coalition politics in California, and he 
saw the growing Latino population as an opportunity worth exploiting to maintain 
power.  While the American racial order is largely seen in black and white, the California 
that Reagan governed was a peek into the future of the diversity of American politics 
which would come over the next thirty years.  Part of his appeal to Latinos was his 
support of bilingual education reform despite the long established law in California 
that education was to be conducted in English only (Brilliant 2012). 
This support came at the expense of opposing policies that were favorable to 
African-Americans. Governor Reagan opposed the Rumford Fair Housing Act, which 
made it illegal to discriminate against African-Americans who wanted to purchase 
or rent property.  The Rumford Act was sponsored by Assemblyman William Byron 
Rumford, one of the first African-Americans elected to any office in California, who 
had a strong record of supporting civil rights legislation while in office.  In response 
to the Rumford Act, Reagan supported Proposition 14, which sought to overturn 
Rumford. Governor Reagan also responded to the growth of the Blank Panther 
movement with some of the strongest gun control measures of any state.  Ironically, it 
was this anti-black sentiment that has formed the basis for the progressive gun control 
regime in California.
Reagan would go on to be President a decade later, but the roots of Republican 
recruitment had already been planted with him, and his running mate, George HW 
Bush, was the founding member of the Republican National Hispanic Assembly 
(RNHA) in 1972.  The RNHA claims that their support for Nixon resulted in 60% 
support among Latinos for Richard Nixon, though polling data in this era for subgroups 
is unreliable and 60% seems unlikely.
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While 60% is not likely, discontent among Latinos with both parties as 
evidenced by the rise of La Raza Unida Party does not make it entirely unbelievable 
that the GOP enjoyed some level of support from Latinos that would demonstrate 
promise to Reagan that Latinos were a potential source of electoral support.  Indeed, 
Reagan hired Lionel Sosa, a marketer who specialized in Latino messaging, to manage 
his outreach efforts into the Latino community for his first campaign. Sosa would 
be a mainstay of the Republican Party over the next twenty years, and he remains a 
powerful symbolic connection between the past and the present among Republicans 
who desire a return to the days when the GOP was seeking ways to be more attractive 
to Latinos. 
It is difficult today to conceive of a Republican Party that would do what it can 
to win over Latinos, especially a party that would go to great lengths to demonstrate 
their care for undocumented immigrants, but that is exactly what happened in a 
primary debate between Reagan and Bush in 1980.  Both candidates fielded questions 
from the audience in Texas, and a participant asked them if they thought that children 
of “illegal aliens” should be allowed to attend Texas public schools for free. Reagan 
and Bush both gave support for educating undocumented students in their responses, 
and their answers continue to confuse conservatives today who claim some ideological 
heritage from Ronald Reagan in those years. 
Education was a burning question for Texans, as it remains a contentious issue 
today. The growing Latino population in Texas had created the social conundrum of 
how to deal with children of undocumented immigrants, and this social issue had deep 
political implications.  Texas had been passing laws to limit access to education for 
these children throughout the decade, but two years after the debate between Reagan 
and Bush, the Supreme Court would hand down their ruling in Plyler v. Doe, which 
struck down these attempts to limit the education of Latinos.  The court found that 
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment applied to these children, and they 
could not be denied access to the public school system based on their immigration 
status (Olivas 2012). 
The fight for access to education, however, did not end with children after the 
Plyler decision in 1982.  As the Latino population grew, so did the push for equal access 
to the university system for undocumented students. As a result, Texas became the first 
state to pass in-state tuition for undocumented students, HB1403, by overwhelming 
margins with only one member of the Texas House voting against the bill and three 
State Senators voting against it.  With little fanfare, Governor Perry signed HB1403 
on June 16, 2001. Ten years later, Governor Perry would have to defend his support for 
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undocumented immigration in a hostile Republican Presidential primary, in which the 
hardline conservatives were accusing him on being soft on “illegal immigrants”.  
3. GOP PRIMARY AND “THE PIVOT” 
The primary process has been a source of discord among Republicans at 
the federal level, but also at the state level where a significant or growing number 
of minorities are present.  Much of this is due to the growing homogeneity of the 
Republican Party, where almost ninety-percent of all Republican primary voters were 
white.  This is an astonishing number given that the country will soon be comprised of a 
demographic in which the majority of the population will belong to an ethnic or racial 
minority group. There are already several important states where this is true, including 
California and Texas.  And there are several states where non-Hispanic whites are less 
than sixty percent of the population, such as Florida. 
As the GOP fails to diversify, its capacity to compromise becomes more difficult 
and as the discussion over immigration percolates, the GOP has found itself out of step 
with rest of the country.  There are essentially two approaches the country can take 
regarding immigrants, particularly the undocumented; an assimilationist approach 
and a criminal approach (See Figure 1). Assimilation includes a humane approach 
to family unification and a sensible pathway to citizenship for the undocumented. 
This approach views this population as members of society who operate outside of the 
system because of our defective immigration policies.  The criminal approach is the 
policy most advocated by the GOP, in which immigrants are viewed as criminals for 
finding themselves outside of legitimate society.  
Figure 2 illustrates how damaging the Republican stance on immigration has 
been.  When Latinos are asked the same question about their preferred approach to 
immigration and whether or not it will make them more likely to vote for a candidate, 
Latinos for both parties, as well as independents overwhelmingly prefer candidates 
who promote the assimilation model.  
The figures below is a graphic illustration of the GOP conundrum regarding 
Latinos and has been reflected in what is known as “the pivot” every four years during 
the campaigns for President and other executive offices throughout the country.  As the 
figure illustrates, the GOP is unique in that the likelihood of support for candidates who 
promote an assimilationist approach to immigration is lower only among Republicans. 
For non-Republicans, assimilation is the dominant strategy for any candidate seeking 
to gain favor among its constituents.  This phenomenon creates a problem for moderate 
Republican candidates in the primary elections, where opposition candidates can 
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threaten viable national candidates by taking a hardline approach to immigration, 
requiring moderate candidates to move further right on the issue than they normally 
would to protect themselves in the primary.
As the GOP base has become hardened in their stance on immigration, it has 
become a litmus test of sorts for primary candidates.  Rick Perry, the governor of Texas, 
had to defend himself for signing the uneventful HB1403 ten years prior and Mitt 
Romney pushed further right to shed any concerns that he might not be committed to 
“conservative” values. In a primary debate in Arizona, Mitt Romney called the infamous 
anti-immigrant bill, SB1070, a “model” for the nation. One popular candidate, Herman 
Cain, said that the country should electrify the fence at our southern border.  Jon 
Huntsman, perhaps the most cosmopolitan of the primary candidates, was not able to 
gain any traction with his reasonable overtures on immigration.  As far as the GOP 
primary was relevant to Latinos, it was a race to the bottom to see who could outdo the 
other in their contempt for Latinos.  
Newt Gingrich, however, was seen as a potentially important candidate 
because he had an immigration proposal that was unusually progressive compared 
to his counterparts.  Mr. Gingrich had spent the year before the primary holding 
special meetings with Latino leaders throughout the country and had immigration 
as a centerpiece issue he argued he could solve.  Mr. Gingrich turned to the Krieble 
Foundation for a policy they called the “Red Card Solution”.  Red Card Solution 
was an attempt to rhetorically and substantively separate the concepts of legalization 
and a pathway to citizenship.  This was an important step for the GOP leadership if 
they were going to have any chance against those in the party who saw a pathway to 
citizenship as “amnesty”.  To Gingrich, this was a solution that could move the party 
forward with Latinos, while finding a suitable compromise that pragmatic Republicans 
could promote to calm their ideological base.    
However, Mr. Gingrich could not get much traction within the party on this 
and he had also made some key outreach mistakes in his messaging.  Mr. Gingrich 
hired a very competent communications manager in Sylvia Garcia to be his National 
Hispanic Inclusion Director, and they made regular press releases in Spanish with 
their English press releases.  However, some Latino activists, while impressed by their 
efforts, were not impressed that their Spanish translator had a Spanish background and 
was a member of the North American Academy of the Spanish Language, an arm of the 
Royal Spanish Academy. While the nuance was lost on Newt Gingrich and they were 
satisfied to hear that his press releases were written in “perfect Spanish”, activists and 
common folk alike did not see this as an effective outreach effort.  This was yet another 
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example of how even genuine attempts to bridge the GOP with Latinos could be 
wrought with pitfalls.
 Regardless, the strategy in the primary went further right rather than taking 
any advice from Newt Gingrich. Instead of working to find some compromise that 
might soften the image of the Party, Republican primary candidates began collecting 
the endorsements of the most ardent national figures against immigrants.  With great 
fanfare, the Romney campaign boasted about the endorsement of Maricopa County 
Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the most notorious figure in the country who has made it his mission 
in life to use the pain and suffering of Latinos to his advantage in elections by stoking 
nativist and racist sentiments of his constituents (Hagan).  Russell Pearce, a State 
Senator in Arizona who has since been recalled for his extreme views against Latinos 
and immigrants, supported Mitt Romney as well, calling Romney’s immigration 
strategy “identical” to his own.  
Russell Pearce was the architect of the State Republican Party’s political 
strategy to us SB1070 to mobilize whites against Latinos in the 2010 election, and 
which brought him close to anti-immigrant groups with racist ties.  One of his former 
supporters and friends who organized the Arizona Militiamen movement against 
immigrants, J.T. Ready, was revered by anti-immigrant politicians until he shot 
four people including a child, and then turned the gun on himself (Rudolph).  Mitt 
Romney had also sought out the endorsement and consultation of Kris Kobach, the 
Secretary of State of Kansas and author of SB1070 along with similar bills passed by 
legislators around the country. Kobach is now representing Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) agents who are suing the federal government for directives ordered 
by the President to prioritize immigration enforcement on violent offenders rather 
than families who are of no danger to society, but have found themselves outside the 
law because of our broken immigration system. 
4. OUTREACH
Republican outreach into the Latino community continues to lag behind that 
of the Democrats and has not been a serious part of the Republican program since 
Lionel Sosa was asked by Ronald Reagan to fashion a marketing campaign targeting 
Latinos. The ¡Viva Bush! campaign in 2004, headed by Jennifer Korn and supported 
by Karl Rove, is often seen as a successful Republican outreach program.  Republicans 
won about 40% of the Latino vote that year, a high watermark for the GOP, but it 
also came in the face of a John Kerry campaign that was a low point for Democratic 
concern over Latinos (Navarette 2004).  The ensuing win by the Bush campaign gave 
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Democrats pause, but we have yet to see a campaign where both parties have made 
equal efforts to recruit Latinos for candidates and as voters. 
At the time, however, 2004 seemed like a symbolic moment for the emergence 
of a political narrative that included Latinos beyond symbolic overtures. The success of 
the Republican Party gave a strong impression that a new era of politics had emerged, 
yet interest in GOP outreach was still relatively low in the academic literature. In 
his review of the literature, Rodolfo O. de la Garza’s (2004: 103) reading of the 
political landscape largely reflects this sentiment. He wrote, “Now that Republicans 
are heavily engaged in convincing the electorate of [a] need for change, scholars would 
be well advised to monitor the extent to which those efforts are penetrating Latino 
communities”. Robert G. Marbut (2004: 82) largely agreed, however, he cautioned 
Republicans not to revert to using nationalistic agendas to mobilize the Anglo base or 
they will be cutting out the fastest growing segment of the population. 
The debate over immigration reform in 2006 – 2007 largely erased the gains 
made by the Bush Administration.  The Bush Administration had initially run for 
office in 2000 on a policy of national integration with Mexico, both economically and 
socially.  In a campaign speech in 1999, candidate Bush said about building a wall 
on our southern border, “The fearful build walls. The confident demolish them.” This 
attitude changed quickly after the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001.  The primary concern on our Southern border was security, and the debate over 
immigration reform in 2006 could not focus the discussion away from the xenophobic 
concerns of the country.  
The immigration debate also brought to the forefront a resurgence in political 
activism by Latinos, with massive marches across the country calling for comprehensive 
immigration reform.  While this gave hope that these marches would put pressure 
on the politicians to write legislation that was favorable towards Latinos, the public 
backlash by conservative radio hardened the Republican Party against positive reform. 
Research measuring the attitudes of American voters following the marches also 
indicated that the protests had provoked negative reactions by the public in general 
(Marks, Nuño, and Sanchez 2008). The end result was no reform and a retrenchment of 
the security-first argument with President Bush authorizing 700 miles of new fencing 
along the border with Mexico.  
Six years later, the Republicans have been unable to recover and the vigilance 
of the anti-immigrant wing of the GOP has dominated the narrative of the party.  The 
GOP has become so reliant on interests that are so directly at odds with Latinos, it has 
created a mindset that has hampered even symbolic gestures to recruit Latinos.  For 
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example, the Hispanic Leadership Network, a Latino outreach program funded by the 
American Action Network and led by Jennifer Korn who ran the ¡Viva Bush! campaign 
mentioned above, sponsored a conference in Albuquerque, New Mexico late in 2011 
to highlight the many achievements of “center-right” Latinos.  However, one of the 
highlighted sponsors of the conference was CCA, also known as the Correctional 
Corporation of America. CCA is the largest private prison corporation in the country 
and has notoriously lobbied legislatures across the country for policies that would 
increase the incarceration rate.  Their connections to conservative politicians in Arizona 
and the SB1070 debate has long been known to be influential with politicians at every 
level of governance, including Governor Jan Brewer. The irony that a private prison 
corporation which heavily lobbies for legislation that targets Latinos to be incarcerated 
was supporting the Hispanic Leadership Network was largely lost on HLN when it 
was brought up, although they did not prominently advertise their ties to CCA in their 
next conference. 
It was out of this that emerged the Republican Party’s Hispanic spokesperson, 
Bettina Inclán, who participated in the HLN conference as an expert in communications. 
Ms. Inclán was hired as the Director of Hispanic Outreach for the Republican National 
Committee and was later appointed the National Deputy Director of Coalitions- 
Hispanic Vote for the Romney campaign. Ms. Inclán worked for the Rick Scott for 
Governor campaign in Florida in 2010, and prior to that she was the Deputy Director 
of Communications for the Steve Poizner for Governor Campaign in California. 
Ms. Inclán is also engaged to a Washington consultant who worked for the Sharon 
Angle for Senate campaign in Nevada. The Poizner and Angle campaigns were both 
unsuccessful, but both campaigns were also known among Latinos as being strongly 
anti-immigrant in their marketing.  
Although Ms. Inclán may be an effective communicator, she is indicative of 
the problems Latinas face in the Republican Party, finding themselves supporting 
candidates with mixed messages.  Latina operatives are highly visible and accentuate 
the dichotomy of reaching out to a demographic that is at the same time being vilified. 
At best they become managers of a tainted image and at worst appear to be apologists 
for policies that Latinos view as hostile to them.  The messaging could get confusing, 
and to a point can confuse the messenger, as well.  Soon after Bettina Inclán was 
appointed as the Republican Party’s Director of Hispanic Outreach in May 2012, she 
was asked to clarify Mitt Romney’s approach to immigration.  Her response was, “As a 




This caused a firestorm of attention by Spanish media and Democrats because 
Mitt Romney had taken such care in the primary to underline his immigration plan, 
which he called “self-deportation”, but it was yet another example of the gap between 
the primary constituents needed to win and the general election voters needed to be a 
viable national candidate. Ms. Inclán fell into obscurity after this high profile moment 
and later made an appearance in an oddly produced commercial called, “The Breakup”, 
where she played a former Obama supporter who was now breaking up with the 
President because of his policies. 
5. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The Republican Party and the Romney campaign made the decision early on 
to focus almost entirely on mobilizing white voters. Their Latino outreach consisted of 
bringing on Bettina Inclán and sending out press releases comprised of lists of Latinos 
who were endorsing Mitt Romney. These lists were mainly from Latino Republicans 
culled from the other primary candidates, particularly Governor Rick Perry of Texas. 
Perhaps the most poignant moment of the campaign in the media was when Ron 
Brownstein of the National Journal reported that a Republican strategist said, “This 
is the last time anyone will try to do this” (Chait), meaning relying almost entirely on 
white voters to win an election. Given the changing demographics, this was a major 
gamble, but it’s not clear Mitt Romney had a choice. 
The primary contest did not end until April because of the persistence of those 
like the Tea Party favorite, Ron Paul, to force Mitt Romney to spend valuable time 
and resources on winning primary elections and caucuses.  Ron Paul supporters were 
claiming that a “brokered convention” was a possibility as late as May. Given the focus 
on winning primaries in which almost 90% of the participants were white, and having 
them drawn out until April, establishing any type of outreach effort to challenge 
President Obama was a tall order.  
The President had focused on key areas around the country with a growing 
influence of Latinos, including Clark County in Nevada, Denver County in Colorado, 
and in the Tampa-Orlando area in northern Florida. Each of these areas were flush 
with Latino voters who could be the deciding factor in a tight race and each of these 
states had substantial growth in the Latino population, particularly Nevada where the 
Latino population increased over 80% from 2000 to 2010 (See Table 1). 
Table 1 reports the twenty states with the highest share of Latinos, the growth 
in the Latino population, the Presidential vote breakdown, and the number of electoral 
votes available in each state. President Obama won thirteen out of the top twenty 
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states, giving him two-hundred fourteen electoral votes to Mitt Romney’s ninety-nine 
electoral votes for winning the other seven states. Its important to note that President 
Obama won four important “swing states” that had a strong Latino influence, Colorado, 
Nevada, New Mexico and Florida.  
As mentioned above, the Obama campaign focused heavily on Latinos here, 
and the efforts of the campaign paid off. Republicans had early hopes in New Mexico 
because of their Republican governor, Susana Martinez, but Mitt Romney lost in New 
Mexico by ten percentage points. Colorado and Nevada were also thought to be very 
close races early in the campaign, but the President won those states by comfortable 
margins, as well, 5% and 7% respectively. Only Florida came in close. Cuban-Americans 
are diminishing in their electoral contribution to the Republican Party because of the 
population growth in the Puerto Rican and other Latin-origin countries, and because 
later generation Cuban-Americans are increasingly straying away from the GOP. It’s 
been clear for some time now that the GOP will need to expand their Latino outreach 
beyond South Florida if they are to remain competitive.
Figure 3 illustrates the vote for Obama in nine important states where Latinos 
had an opportunity to impact the election. Nationally, the President won over 75% of 




It is difficult to see how the Republican Party can recover from such a dismal 
performance among Latinos. It is clear that the GOP must adjust to the changing 
demographics of the country, but it is not clear yet how the GOP will manage to do 
that given the hardened stance of their constituents on immigration. They can start by 
giving a larger voice to the few Hispanics they do have in the party. Fortunately for 
them, the GOP has been successful at putting forth Latino candidates at the State level. 
Research has shown that co-ethnic candidates can act as a mobilizing force (Barreto 
2010). Latino candidates can also act as an effective recruiter that can overcome barriers 
to communication endemic in GOP outreach (Nuño). With Senator Marco Rubio of 
Florida and Senator Cruz of Texas, the GOP possesses two of the three Latinos in 
the Senate. The Republicans also have the only two Latino governors in the country, 
Governor Brian Sandoval of Nevada and Governor Martinez of New Mexico.  
Many pundits and scholars point out that these Republicans would be 
ineffective in recruiting Latinos over to the GOP.  It is often pointed out that Cuban-
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Americans, such as Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, would be largely ineffective at winning 
over Latinos who are primarily Mexican-Americans in the Southwest. That may or 
may not be true, but strategists should remember that the primary necessity among 
Republicans isn’t necessarily winning over Latino voters, but convincing independent 
white voters that the Republican Party is not extreme in their views. As we have seen, 
independent voters would prefer candidates who promote an assimilation model 
of immigration reform.  Latino candidates, like Mr. Rubio, would go a long way in 
softening the Republican image among white voters.  Along with the Latino Senators, 
Governors Sandoval and Martinez can act as ambassadors to the Republican core 
voters, and perhaps convince them that a more sensible approach to immigration 
would be best not only for the country, but the Party itself.  
But along with the tonal shift in the GOP, the Republican Party will need to 
reevaluate their policies and see how they can make adjustments (Alvarez and Bedolla 
2003). With regards to immigration, the GOP may want to adopt a more market-based 
approach to immigration, rather than allowing cultural factors to drive their viewpoint. 
Promoting small business growth, home ownership, and better opportunities for school 
choice, are other areas that seem to be a natural source of votes for the GOP. It may also 
be beneficial to take a global approach in appealing to Latinos, and developing greater 
commercial integration with Spanish-speaking countries. 
Expanding recruitment efforts will also be important. If the GOP is going to sell 
their policies to the Latino electorate, they will need a diverse stable of representatives 
to do so. Establishing a concerted program to recruit Latinos to run for office will need 
to be a top priority for the party. Without more Latino faces, the damaged brand of 
the GOP will have a difficult time overcoming the barriers to communication between 
the party and Latinos.  
The GOP also needs to assess the structural disadvantages created by the 
primary process. With Republicans already at a disconnect with the electorate at large on 
immigration, the GOP primaries require candidates to make up a lot of distance between 
their far right appeals for their white primary voters and the moderate messaging that is 
necessary for the general election. It would be worth the effort to evaluate the order in 
which the primaries are conducted, and move up primaries in states with a more diverse 
population. With Iowa playing such a prominent symbolic role, GOP candidates are 
forced to promote a message that only damages the party.  It may make more sense to 
move up states like Texas, Florida and Colorado, so that GOP candidates will be forced 
to consider the effect their positions will have on Latino voters.
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As the GOP struggles with the future of their party, it will be incumbent upon 
the Democrats to convince Latinos why they should remain in the Democratic Party 
beyond being second worst in a two-party system. While the decisions that lay ahead for 
the GOP will be contentious, the demographic reality facing the cultural purists on the 
right has already determined the future of the Republican Party. While this process will 
take longer in some states than in others, the greatest unknown question is how will the 
Democrats respond when the GOP does come up with a viable strategy for Latinos? 
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Population % Obama % Romney %
Electoral 
Votes
New Mexico 25% 46.3% 52.0% 42.0% 5
California 28% 37.6% 60.2% 37.1% 55
Texas 42% 37.6% 38.0% 57.2% 38
Arizona 46% 29.6% 44.5% 53.5% 11
Nevada 82% 26.5% 52.4% 45.7% 6
Florida 57% 22.5% 50.0% 49.1% 29
Colorado 41% 20.7% 51.5% 46.1% 9
New Jersey 39% 17.7% 58.3% 40.6% 14
New York 19% 17.6% 63.3% 35.2% 29
Illinois 33% 15.8% 57.6% 40.7% 20
Connecticut 50% 13.4% 58.1% 40.7% 7
Utah 78% 13.0% 24.7% 72.8% 6
Oregon 64% 11.7% 54.2% 42.1% 7
Washington 71% 11.2% 56.2% 41.0% 12
Kansas 59% 10.5% 38.0% 59.7% 6
Massachusetts 46% 9.6% 60.7% 37.5% 11
Oklahoma 85% 8.9% 33.2% 66.8% 7
Georgia 96% 8.8% 45.5% 53.3% 16
North Carolina 111% 8.4% 48.4% 50.4% 15
Maryland 107% 8.2% 62.0% 35.9% 10
Source: Demographic data compiled using US Census. Election data compiled from 
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